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ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY THE RECKLESS MOTORIST
Livingston Hall*
The tendency to use negligence or
recklessness in the criminal law as a
basis for conviction, in place of the re-
quirement in the early law of inten-
tional wrongdoing, has been a charac-
teristic of the law for centuries. Per-
haps the most striking feature in this
development in recent times has been
the efflorescence of the concept of reck-
lessness as a basis of conviction for
assault and battery, without proof of
a clear-cut intent to inflict injury,
where bodily injury less than death has
resulted from the defendant's act or
omission. The Age of Invention has
come, developing devices of a deadli-
ness formerly unknown and requiring
for their safe handling a high degree
of care, and a considerable number of
such convictions appear in the books
and on the court records.
As in the field of torts, it is the auto-
mobile which now accounts for most
of these recklessness cases. It was sug-
gested by the late Professor Tulin a
dozen years ago that the concept of
"assault by the reckless use of an auto-
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. For
assistance in preparing this article, the Wvriter is
indebted to Selig J. Seligman, a third year stu-
dent at the Harvard Law School.
1 Tuin, The Role of Penalties in Criminal Law,
(1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048, hereafter cited as
"Tulin" It is not clear whether or not this theory
is adopted in the note in (1939) 16 N. Y. U. I. Q.
Rev. 290 at 294, on the influence of the doctrine
of criminal intent on criminal legislation affect-
ing motor vehicles.
2 Judicial legislation through spurious inter-
mobile" was developed by resourceful
courts as a means of securing a suitable
penalty to be imposed upon the reck-
less driver who has caused personal
injury, not resulting in death, where
the penalties for the statutory offense
of reckless driving were inadequate.1
If this were true, and if although legis-
latures meant to impose a low penalty,
courts arbitrarily expanded another
crime to reach a different result, it
would indeed be unfortunate judicial
legislation. 2
This proposition raises important
questions in the development of the
criminal law, and seems to warrant a
careful re-examination of the auiomo-
bile assault cases, and an investigation
of the earlier cases dealing with reck-
lessness as a basis for liability for as-
sault and battery.
The results of this investigation do
not wholly bear out Professor Tulin's
thesis. It appears that the concept of a
"reckless battery" was fully developed
in the United States before the first
automobile cases were decided, and
pretation of statutes has been condemned in the
strongest terms. Landis, A Note on "Statutory
Interpretation," (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886.
Quite as improper is the unwarranted extension
of criminal liability through the development of
new common law crimes. See notes in (1933)
49 L. Q. Rev. 183 and (1934) 5 Camb. L. J. 263,
criticizing the decision in Rex v. Manley, (1933)
1 K. B. 529, which created the offence of "public
mischief" tc convict a woman for falsely stating
to the police that she had been robbed, and caus-




that the latter bad their roots in deci-
sions going back at least 50 years. The
law of battery developed during the lat-
ter half of the 19th century along com-
mon law principles, from intent to
recklessness, in the same manner as the
law of manslaughter (and in cases of
extreme recklessness, of murder) had
unfolded two centuries earlier. The
coming of the automobile, and the de-
sire of prosecutors for heavier penalties
than many reckless driving statutes
permit, have done no more than pro-
vide numerous modem instances of this
development.
A working distinction between reck-
lessness and intent must be made be-
fore we can proceed with the discus-
sion. There is an extensive literature
on the subject, s but for our purposes we
may regard an actor as intending those
consequences of an act which (a) he
desires to accomplish, or (b) he knows
are substantially certain to be produced
by his act.' To say that a man is "pre-
sumed to intend the probable conse-
quences of his acts" is to conceal, by
the use of an irrebuttable presumption
of law, the fact that he need not intend
the consequences in order to be liable.
Negligence, recklessness, and the
a One of the most complete treatments of the
subject is found in Cook, Act, Intention and Mo-
tive in the Criminal Law, (1917) 26 Yale L. J.
645 at 654-8.
4 This is the definition put forward in Perkins,
A Rationale of Mens Rea, (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev.
905 at 910-1. There is also authority that an ac-
tor further intends those consequences which he
knows are substantially certain to result from
his act if his act accomplishes the consequences
which he desires, although it may be far from
certain that the act will in fact result in these
consequences. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.
S. 616 (1919). Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent
did not maintain that such consequences were
not intended, but rather that the statute under
which Abrams was prosecuted should not be
"depraved conduct" which is sufficient
for murder, differ from intent in that
the actor does not desire to accomplish
the harmful consequence in question,
nor does he know that it is substan-
tially certain to result. Liability is
predicated upon the fact that he has
created an unreasonable risk that it
will result. The magnitude of the risk
required, to make it unreasonable, de-
pends upon the social utility of the
act done, and upon whether a convic-
tion is sought for battery or man-
slaughter, on the one hand, or for
murder.5
Whether or not it is also necessary
to prove that the defendant knew the
magnitude of the risk is a question
upon which the authorities are not
clear. In the absence of some serious
mistake of fact by the defendant, often
based upon intoxication or insanity, it
is usually immaterial which view as to
awareness is adopted. In cases where
awareness is not in issue, obviously the
degree of risk involved will, as it in-
creases, run from negligence through
recklessness and the "depraved heart"
to intent, without any fixed boundary.
Nevertheless, the distinction has mean-
ing, hard to phrase though it may be,
read to extend to all intended consequences, but
only to consequences which the actor desired to
produce.
5In Pennsylvania, a greater degree of reck-
lessness is required for battery than for man-
slaughter. Com. v. Bergen, 134 Pa. Super. 62, 4 A.
2d 164 (1939). Ordinarily there is no difference
between these two crimes in this respect. See
intra, note pp. 144, 153.
6 This question is discussed in Wechsler and
Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide,
(1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 701, 1261 at 1274-76, and in
a note, (1939) 27 Ky. L J. 229. Com. v. Pierce, 138
Mass. 165 (I84) adopts an objective standard of
care, but a subjective standard still prevails in
England. Andrews v. Director of Public Prose-
cutions, [1937] A. C. 576.
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and borderline cases are not as fre-
quent as one might expect.
Relationship Between Manslaughter,
Assault, and Battery.
Recklessness as a ground of criminal
liability in personal injury crimes prob-
ably did not appear until the late 16th
or early 17th century. As has been
pointed out by Professor Sayre,7 there
may have been absolute liability for
criminal homicide before the 12th cen-
tury. But such a harsh rule, if it ever
existed, was relatively short-lived.
About that time its place was taken by
a rule of the canon law brought into
the common law by Bracton-the rule
that an unintended killing in the course
of an unlawful act malum in se would
constitute manslaughter." Liability un-
der this rule is not based upon reck-
lessness, except where, as in some
modern cases, the phrase "a.um in
se" is interpreted in terms of danger-
ousness, and not, as was originally true,
in terms of morality. The illegal intent
accompanying the unlawful act from
which death occurred is regarded as
sufficient to justify a conviction. As the
law later developed, a murder convic-
tion was possible if the unlawful act
were a felony, and liability for a bat-
tery may be imposed for an uninten-
ded injury resulting from an unlaw-
T Sayre, Mens Rea, (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974.
8 Bracton, De Legibus (1268) f. 120-121; see
Maitland, Bracton and Azo, Publications of the
Selden Society (VoL VIII, 1894) 232.
9 This doctrine was apparently first stated to be
applicable in battery cases as early as 1873, in
Com. v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323 (1873). It has been
extensively applied in automobile cases. In Ohio,
where battery is defined by Page Gen. Code
(I939) §12423 and earlier statutes as "unlawfully
striking or wounding another," liability without
intent to injure can be predicated only upon the
commission of an unlawful act. Fishwick v.
ful act, where there would have been
liability for manslaughter had death
ensued.'
The concept of recklessness as suf-
ficient for criminal liability for man-
slaughter appears fully developed in
Hul's Case in 1664.10 Hull was indicted
for murder where he had thrown a
piece of timber from a height of two
stories, killing another workman. The
house stood 30 ft. from a highway or
common passage, and Hull had cried
"stand clear" before throwing the tim-
ber. Two of the three judges agreed
that this was only misadventure, but
they put the case of a similar act done
in the City of London with the house
touching the street, which, they said
would constitute manslaughter, due to
the number of people passing by, "be-
cause in common presumption his in-
tention was to do mischief, when he
casts or shoots anything which might
kill among a multitude of people."
A few years earlier there had been
a somewhat similar decision in a mur-
der case, Rex v. Halloway," where
Halloway had tied a boy to the tail
of a horse and had beaten the boy,
causing the horse to run away with
him. Upon these facts, the court held
that "it shall be said in law to be pre-
pensed malice, he doing it to one who
made no resistance." In this case there
State, 14 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 368,33 Ohio Circ. Dec.
63 (1911); Keuhn v. State, 37 Ohio App. 217, 174
N. E. 606 (1930). In this respect battery follows
the Ohio manslaughter rule of Johnson v. State,
66 Ohio St. 59, 63 N. E. 607 (1902). No attempt has
been made in this article completely to cover
this type of criminal liability.
10 J. Kelyng 40, 84 Eng. Repr. 1072 (1664). There
is a full discussion of the history of this develop-
ment in homicide cases in Davis, The Develop-
ment of Negligence as a Basis for Liability in
Criminal Homicide Cases, (1938) 26 Ky. L, J. 209.
11 Cro. Car. 131, 79 Eng. Repr. 715 (1628).
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was certainly an intention to do some
injury to the boy, but it was the great
danger of death, although death was
pretty clearly not intended, which
caused the murder conviction. From
these cases stem the modern common
law rules that a killing due to gross
carelessness or recklessness is man-
slaughter; 12  while if the evidence
"shows an abandoned and malignant
heart on the part of the defendant," it,
is common law murder, although there
was no intention to kill or even to
cause injury." These common law
crimes based upon recklessness have
their statutory counterparts in many
states which have abandoned the com-
mon law definitions of manslaughter'
or murder.15
In tracing the adoption, in cases
where death did not result, of these
homicide tests of recklessness or wan-
ton conduct, we must make a clear-
cut distinction between assault and
battery. If there has been no actual
12 See Riesenfeld, Negligent Homicide, (1936)
25 Calif. L. Rev. 1, and Robinson, Manslaughter
by Motorists, (1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 755.
IsMayes v. People, 106 IlM. 306 (1883). Less
strong language is used in phrasing the test in
Com. v. McLaughlin, 293 Pa. 218, 142 Atl. 213
(1928).
14 Manslaughter is usually defined to include a
killing by a gross or culpable negligence. In
Ohio, where it is limited to a "killing by an un-
lawful act," gross negligence is not enough.
Johnson v. State, 66 Ohio St. 59, 63 N. E. 607
(1902). Contra, Minardo v. State, 204 Ind. 422,
183 N. E. 548 (1932), under a similar statute.
Statutes are not uncommon which provide a
lesser penalty for a killing by a motor vehicle
through a failure to use ordinary care. See Rie-
senfeld, Negligent Homicide, (1936) 25 Calif. L.
Rev. 1.
15 Usually a killing committed "by an act im-
minently dangerous to others, and evincing a de-
praved mind, regardless of human life, without
a premediated design to effect death" constitutes
the lowest degree of murder. Minn. Stat. (1927)
§10070 (third degree) and Wis. State. (1937)
§340.03 (second degree) are typical. But by New
physical injury or offensive touching,
the crime is invariably referred to as
an "assault." It is usually held that
there can be no criminal liability un-
less there was an intent to inflict bodily
injury or an offensive touching, and
recklessness is never enough for lia-
bility.'" In some states, an intent to
cause apprehension in the victim is
enough for conviction, due to the in-
fluence of civil assault cases. 17  This
general rule has been followed in auto-
mobile cases, as in other cases, and no
cases have been found in which crim-
inal liability was imposed for a reck-
less assault, which did not cause either
injury or offensive touching. 8 (With
the other possible additional require-
ments for a criminal assault, apprehen-
sion of the victim and present ability,
we are, of course, not here concerned.)
If there has been actual physical in-
jury or an offensive touching, courts
often use the terms "assault" and "bat-
tery" interchangeably to apply to the
York Penal Law §1044, such a killing is murder
in the first degree, and it has been held that the
act must endanger a number of people. People
v. Ludkowitz, 266 N. Y. 233, 194 N. E. 688 (1935).
16 United States v. Hand, 2 Wash. C. C. 435
(1810) is an early case which has never been
questioned. See Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048
at 1053.
17 Thne cases are collected in a note, The Mis-
use of the Tort Definition of Assault in a Crim-
inal Action, (1939) 11 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 104. The
note, however, fails to distinguish between com-
mon law assault cases and cases decided under
various statutory provisions, and its conclusions
as to the weight of authority at the common law
are open to question on this ground. See also,
State v. Desco, ... Vt ... , 1 A. (2d) 710 (1938).
Under statutes defining an assault as "an attempt
to commit a battery" it should not be possible
to convict where the defendant merely intended
to alarm the victim. McKay v. State, 44 Tex. 43
(1875).
is Of course, if there is an actual intention to
cause injury or apprehension thereof, an assault
without injury may be committed as well by an
automobile as in any other way. Cf. Bryson v.
State, 20 S. W. (2d) 1047 (Tex. Cr. App. 1929).
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crime,' 9 and the same is true in many
statutes, since the punishment is usu-
ally the same.2 0 Speaking accurately,
such a crime is a "battery."
The considerations which should gov-
ern criminal liability for assault and for
battery are entirely different. An as-
sault is in the nature of an attempt to
inflict a battery, and for all such incom-
plete crimes the specific intention to
commit the crime which has been at-
tempted is of the essence of the at-
tempt. Until the coming of the auto-
mobile it was not necessary to punish
those who merely created a risk of in-
jury, and there has never been a com-
mon law crime of "negligence in the
air." The development of criminal lia-
bility for "reckless driving" without
injury, following the coming of the
automobile, has been exclusively sta-
tutory.
The manslaughter analogy has no
possible application to support the de-
velopment of a common law assault or
other crime based on recklessness,
where there has been no injury. In
the involuntary manslaughter cases, the
serious consequence of death resulting
from an act which is reckless or illegal,
19 In a few cases a distiction has been taken
between these cimes, een where physical in-
jury was proved. See infra, p. 149.
20 Thus New York Penal Law §244 provides:
"A person who commits an assault or an assault
and battery * * * is guilty of assault in the
third degree." Vernon's Texas Penal Code (1936)
art. 1144 provides: "The word 'battery' is used
in this Code in the same sense as 'assault and
battery'." But in California, where the punish-
ment for assault differs from that for battery, it
becomes necessary to keep the terms separate,
and a conviction of assault requires proof or
presumption of intent, even though there has
been a clear battery. People v. Vasquez, 85 Cal.
App. 575, 259 Pac. 1005 (1927). See infra, p. 149.
21 Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the
Law of Homicide (1937) 37 CoL L. Rev. 701, 1261
at 1294-98.
but not intended to produce death, justi-
fies a serious penalty upon retributive
grounds. It has been said that this is
also true under a deterrent theory of
punishment.21 Obviously this same an-
alogy applies to liability for battery
based upon the happening of physical
injury short of death due to reckless-
ness or an unlawful act. Many cases
have noted this fact, or cited man-
slaughter cases in support of a con-
viction for such a battery2 2 But the
principle that the harmful result of such
conduct may justify a punishment not
warranted by the conduct without any
harmful result, does not warrant the
imposition of punishment for an assault
if no physical harm at all has been
caused by the conduct of the defen-
dant, and he did not intend to inflict
injury.
Nevertheless, it is by analogy to cases
holding that there can be no assault
without physical injury, unless there
was an intention to inflict harm or at
least to cause apprehension, and upon
one New Jersey case holding that reck-
lessness with an automobile did consti-
tute an assault and battery,2" that Pro-
fessor Tulin based his major premise:
22 Some of the more striking cases are Com. v.
Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551, 32 N. E. 862 (1893); Tyner
v. United States, 2 Okla. Cr. 689, 103 Pac. 1057
(1909); Winkler v. State, 45 Okla. Cr. 32A 283
Pac. 591 (1929); Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 98
N. E. 640 (1912); State v. Sudderth, 184 N. C. 753,
114 S. E. 828 (1922); Brinhall v. State, 31 Ariz.
522, 255 Pac. 165 (1927); State v. Agnew, 202 N. C.
755, 164 S. E. 578 (1932). There are a very few
cases which deny the analogy. State v. Thomas,
65 N. J. L. 598, 48 AUt. 1007 (1900) contains a state-
ment to this effect which was not overruled in
State v. Schutte, 87 N. J. L. 15, 93 Atl. 112 (1915).
See also, Woodward v. State, 164 Miss. 468, 144
So. 895 (1932).
23 State v. Schutte, 87 N. J. L. 15, 93 At. 11Z
aff'd 88 N. J. L. 396, 96 Atl. 659 (1916). See infra,
p. 147.
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Before the automobile battery cases
were decided, there could be "no such
thing as a 'negligent' battery."24
Even if one were to limit his con-
sideration of the subject to the English
law, this statement would go beyond
any decided English case. In the early
case of Rex v. Gill,25 a man was in-
dicted "for throwing down skins into
a man's yard, which was a public way,
per quod another man's eye was beat
out." The evidence showed that the
wind had taken the skin and blown it
away, and the defendant was acquitted.
From the cases cited by the court, it
appears clear that there was no neg-
ligence here at all.
In the later English case of Reg. v.
Martin,26 there is a statement that
recklessness was enough for a convic-
tion under 24 and 25 Vict. c. 100, §20,
punishing as a misdemeanant "Whoso-
ever shall unlawfully and maliciously
wound or inflict any grievous bodily
harm on another person." The jury
found that the defendant, who had put
out the lights in a theatre at the close
of the performance and fixed an iron
bar across the doorway, as a result of
which many persons had been crushed
in the crowd, had done so "with the
intention of causing terror and alarm"
and "wilfully obstructing the means of
24 Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048 at 1053. Cases
holding that there can be liability for a battery
where the defendant aims at one person and hits
another do not add anything one way or the
other, for it is well settled even in the few states
which require an intent to inflict injury, that the
intent need not be directed toward the person
actually hit, to constitute a common law battery.
People ex rel. Starvis v. Rogers, 170 Misc. 609, 10
N. Y. S. 2d 722 (City Ct. New Rochelle 1939).
But an aggravated assault statute or indictment
may require the intention to be directed against
the person actually wounded. Rex v. Holt, 7
Car. & P. 518 (1836); People v. Stoyan, 280 Ill.
exit." Lord Coleridge dealt with the
case as on the same footing with the
"malice" needed for murder, and
Stephen, J., thought that "if the pris-
oner did these acts recklessly he did
them wilfully," and the conviction was
affirmed. The counts for assault had
been withdrawn from the jury, but
Stephen, J., "had very great doubt
whether they were not maintainable."
However this may be, it is commonly
stated by modern writers upon the
English law that there can be no com-
mon law criminal battery without
"actual intention" to commit injury,27
although no other criminal cases are
cited upon the question.
The crime of battery in the United
States has developed much farther,
drawing from the manslaughter anal-
ogy. The earliest extension was appar-
ently by a statute in Missouri enacted
in 1845 which made it a felony: 28
'If any person shall be maimed,
wounded or disfigured, or receive great
bodily harm, or his life be endangered,
by the act, procurement, or culpable neg-
ligence of another, in cases and under
circumstances which would constitute
murder or manslaughter if death had
ensued."
There do not seem to have been any
American common law prosecutions for
reckless battery, or cases even discuss-
300, 117 N. E. 464 (1917). See note, (1938) 42 Dick.
L. Rev. 86.
25 1 Strange 190, 93 Eng. Repr. 466 (1719).
26 14 Cox C. C. 633 (1881).
27 Russell, Crimes, (9th Eng. ed., 1936) 567-77;
Kenney, Outlines of Criminal Law, (14th Eng.
ed., 1933) 160-61.
28 Act of March 27, 1845, art. 2, §38, now Mo.
Stat. (1932) §4016, carrying imprisonment up to 5
years. This statute was applied in State v.
Groves, 194 Mo. 452, 92 S. W. 631 (1906), to a case
of reckless shooting, and it has since been applied
to reckless motorists; see infra, note 119.
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ing the question, until 1855. In the next
decade three cases were decided which
forecast the various lines of develop-
ment of the next half century. 29 It was
apparently not until the pistol became
a widely-owned weapon that prosecu-
tors had made any attempt to extend
the concept of battery to the man-
slaughter limits.30 Prior studies have
touched only lightlys upon the reck-
less battery cases decided prior to the
first automobile battery case of this
type in 1912,31 but it seems necessary to
investigate these authorities with some
care if the factors which produced the




(a) Supporting a Requirement of
Intent to Injure.
The first case found which in any
way appears to advance this doctrine
is Commonwealth v. Randall,s a Massa-
chusetts case decided in 1855. Here
the defendant, a school teacher, had
been convicted of assault and battery
where he had, as the jury found, inflict-
ed "improper and excessive punish-
ment" upon one of his scholars. Of
course, he had intended to inflict bodily
injury or harm, but he asked the judge
29 Com. v. Randall, 4 Gray (Mass.) 36 (1855),
infra, this page; State v. Sloanaker, 1 Houst.
(Del.) 62 (1858), infra, p. 142; State v. Myers,
19 Ia. 517 (1865), infra, p. 143.
so It will be noted that most of the. cases cited
in this article which imposed liability for a reck-
less battery prior to 1900 involved the use of
pistols, which are of course much more likely to
be carelessly handled and to cause injury than
rifles. In 1812 the first statute against carrying
a concealed weapon was passed, and by 1855
such statutes were in force in seven states. But
they did not become common until after 1911.
to charge the jury that he could not be
guilty unless he had acted "malo
animo." The conviction was affirmed,
the Massachusetts court holding the re-
fusal of his requested charge to be
correct, and saying:3'
'It is undoubtedly true that, in order
to support an indictment for assault and
battery, it is necessary to show that it
was committed ex intentione, and that if
the criminal intent is wanting, the of-
fence is not made out. But this intent
is always inferred from the unlawful act.
The unreasonable and excessive use of
force on the person of another being
proved, the wrongful intent is a neces-
sary and legitimate conclusion in all
cases where the act was designedly com-
mitted. It then becomes an assault
and battery, because purposely inflicted
without justification or excuse."
At first reading, the language seems
to bear upon our problem, for an act
ex intentione is expressly required. But
all that the court held was that if there
was an intentional infliction of injury,
it was not necessary that the defend-
ant realize also that as a matter of
law he was inflicting excessive force in
order to have the requisite criminal
intent for conviction. In other words,
a mistake of law of this type is no
defense to this crime. Bishop in 1865
cited the case in a footnote to a
guarded statement that for criminal
liability "it seems not to be always
See Warner, The Uniform Pistol Act, (1938) 29
Jour. Crim. L. 529.
s1 Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048 at 1060-62,
discusses only the cases cited in State v. Schutte,
87 N. J. L. 15, 93 AUt. 112 (1915).
32 This was Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 98
N. E. 640 (1912). There is one earlier automobile
battery case, which was not based upon reckless-
ness but upon the commission of an unlawful
act resulting in injury. Fishwick v. State, 14
Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 368,33 Ohio C. D. 63 (1911).
38 4 Gray (Mass.) 36 (1855).
8 44 Gray (Mass.) 38-9.
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necessary that there should be a spe-
cific intent to commit an assault, or a
battery, or any other crime which in law
includes an assault."" Nor was the case
cited at all when in 1893 the Massachu-
setts court squarely held that a bat-
tery could be predicated upon "gross
carelessness and negligence, or wan-
ton and reckless conduct.
3 6
Precisely similar to the Randall case
in facts, language, and ground of de-
cision, is the Indiana case of Vanvactor
v. State.3 7 The statement is again made
that "To support a charge of an as-
sault and battery it is necessary to
show that the act complained of was
intentionally committed." (Italics in
original.) The court goes on to say that
proof of excessive force will supply the
needed intent. As the evidence did not
prove that excessive force was used,
the conviction was reversed. And as
happened to the Randall case, this
Indiana dictum about intent was in
substance overruled in 1889, to the ex-
tent that it might require an intent to
inflict injury which could not be im-
plied from recklessness, by a later
Indiana case, Mercer v. Corbin,3" in
which the Vanvactor case was not even
cited.
More to the point are later New
York cases. Although only dicta, they
seem to have established a New York
rule that there must be an intent to
injure to constitute an "assault and
battery" as defined by the New York
31 2 Bishop, Criminal Law (3rd ed., 1865) §76.
3G Com. v. Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551, 32 N. E. 862
(1893).
37 113 Ind. 276, 15 N. E. 341 (1887).
38 117 Ind. 450, 20 N. E. 132 (1889).
39 4 N. Y. Cr. 193 (5th Dept. 1885).
40 4 N. Y. Cr. 197.
statutes in common law terms. In
People v. Sullivan," the defendant had
choked a woman with his hands and
drew a butcher knife "as if to cut her
throat but did not injure her otherwise
than to choke her some." He was con-
victed of assault in the second degree
under New York Penal Code §218 pun-
ishing one who "wilfully and wrong-
fully assaults another by the use of a
weapon or other instrument or thing
likely to produce grievous bodily
harm." The trial judge had charged
the jury that the defendant was guilty
if he made an assault with the butcher
knife, although he did not intend to do
bodily harm with the knife. The con-
viction was reversed, the court saying:
"To constitute a criminal assault an
intent to do bodily harm, or by violence
to insult, is requisite." 0 It will be
noted, however, that there was here no
battery with the deadly weapon, and
the choking warranted a conviction
only of simple assault and battery.
Similar statements are contained in
other cases involving assault without
injury,41 and in a case involving a bat-
tery through rude conduct, in which it
was held that taking a girl's arm in a
friendly way, without an intent to insult
her or to be rude, did not constitute
a criminal battery." However weak as
authority these decisions may be as to
the possibility of a reckless battery,
the New York legislature in 1921
evidently felt it necessary to broaden
41 People v. Ryan, 55 Hun 214, 7 N. Y. Cr. 448
(1st Dept. 1889); People v. Terrell, 58 Hun 602, 11
N. Y. S. 364 (5th Dept. 1890); cf. Hays v. People,
1 Hill 351 (1841).
42 People v. Hale, 1 N. Y. Cr. 533 (3rd Dept.
1883); cf. Clayton v. Keeler, 18 Misc. 488, 42 N.
Y. S. 1051 (1896).
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the definition of simple assault and
battery in New York Penal Law §244
to include the infliction of bodily in-
jury by the operation of a vehicle in
a culpably negligent manner.4
8
The last state to hold that there may
not be a common law conviction for
assault and battery based on negligence
appears to be New Jersey. In State v.
Thomas,44 defendant was indicted for
manslaughter but convicted of assault
and battery. The Court of Errors and
Appeals reversed the conviction, on the
ground that a manslaughter indictment
did not necessarily charge an assault
and battery, since manslaughter could
be committed without an assault and
battery. After discussing State v.
O'Brien,4" in which a switch tender had
been convicted of manslaughter where
he negligently failed to perform his
duty, the court in the Thomas case
said: 48
"Certainly if death had not ensued
from his negligence, but only personal
injury, a charge of criminal assault and
battery could not have been sustained."
There is no evidence that the court
had investigated the law on the sub-
ject, and no cases were cited in support
of this statement. It is significant that
in the next New Jersey case involving
a reckless battery, a number of de-
cisions from other states holding that
there could be such a crime were called
to the court's attention, and the de-
43 Laws 1921, ch. 238, amending Penal Law §244.
There is a recent dictum that "intent is necessary
to constitute an assault" in other cases, in People
ex rel. Starvis v. Rogers, 170 Misc. 609, 610, 10 N.
Y .S. 2d 722 (City Ct. New Rochelle 1939).
44 65 N. . L. 598, 48 Alt. 1007 (1900).
45 3 Vroom 169 (1867).
48 65 N. J. L. 600.
cision in the Thomas case was in effect
overruled, although the court was un-
willing to appear to do so, and used
the language of presumed intent.47
The express provisions of the Texas
statutes prevented the development of
a reckless battery in that state. Ver-
non's Texas Penal Code (1936) art.
1138 has provided for more than 50
years:
"The use of any unlawful violence
upon the person of another, with intent
to injure him, whatever be the means or
the degree of violence used, is an assault
and battery." (Italics supplied.)
Of course the Texas Court of Appeals,
in the first case to come before it on
this question,48 was forced to say: "To
constitute an assault and battery there
must be an intent to injure." (Italics
in original.) The Texas law has always
followed this case, and although the
statute further provides that if bodily
injury is inflicted, the burden is then
placed upon the defendant to prove
that there was no intent to inflict in-
jury,49 yet if the evidence, even in an
automobile case, shows that the injury
was caused by negligence and without
intent to injure, the conviction must be
reversed. 0 By Texas Acts of 1917, c.
207, the legislature broadened the defi-
nition of battery to coincide with the
common law definition by making any
driver of a motor vehicle or motor-
cycle who "shall wilfully or with gross
47 State v. Schutte, 87 N. J. L. 15, 93 Atl. 112
(1915), aff'd 88 N. J. L. 396, 96 Atl. 659 (1916).
48 Rutherford v. State, 13 Tex. App. 92 (1882).
49 Vernon's Texas Penal Code (1936) art. 1139.
50 Coffey v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. Rep. 481, 200 S.
W. 384 (1918), involving an aggravated battery
under Branch's Penal Code (1916) §1022, provid-
ing "An assault or battery becomes aggravated
when cominitted * * * when a serious bodily
injury is inflicted upon the person assaulted.
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negligence collide with or cause injury
to any other person" guilty of aggra-
vated assault. As this section now
reads,5 no more than ordinary negli-
gence appears to be required.52
We see, therefore, that the doctrine
that an intent to inflict injury was
necessary at the common law for a con-
viction of assault and battery in 1912,
when the- first automobile case of reck-
less battery was decided, rested on two
dicta, both of which had already been
overruled, and upon the New York and
New Jersey cases, with a Texas sta-
tute to provide a moral support. But
even in 1912 the weight of authority
was clearly against this view, as the
next two sections show.
(b) Imputing an Intent to Injure from
Recklessness
We start and end our discussion of
pre-automobile cases of this type with
State v. Sloanaker.58 A Delaware nisi
prius case decided in 1858, it appears
to be the first case recognizing that
there might be such a thing as a reck-
less battery. The evidence showed that
the defendant had fired a pistol while
on the platform of a railway car, and
had hit another passenger, one Brown.
The defendant testified that the pistol
had been accidentally discharged, but
the state claimed that he had recklessly
discharged it into the crowd of people
on the train, and tried him for assault
and battery with intent to kill Brown.
The trial court charged the jury that
defendant was not guilty of any crime
51 Vernon's Texas Penal Code (1936) Arts.
1149 (as amended in 1939), 1230 et seq. See infra,
p. 152, for the present text of the statute.
if the pistol was discharged "uninten-
tionally and by accident merely, how-
ever imprudent, or improper, it may
have been," but that if the jury "were
satisfied by the proof that he discharged
it intentionally and wantonly or reck-
lessly into the crowd of persons as-
sembled about the place at the time,
or in the direction of the carriage of the
prosecuting witness, indifferent as to
whom he might shoot, or what the mis-
chief or injury might be, or where or
on whom it might fall, such conduct
would manifest a wicked and depraved
inclination and disposition on his part,
that it might well be presumed by them
that he intended at the time to shoot
some one, upon the principle that every
one is presumed to intend the natural
and probable consequence of his own
act," and that he might be convicted
of simple assault and battery upon such
evidence. As to the assault with intent
to kill Brown, the court charged that
this intent could not be made out by
any such "inference or presumption.".
The defendant was acquitted by the
jury, and drops out of the picture.
However, this presumption of an in-
tent to injure from the intentional do-
ing of a reckless act was to reappear
in later automobile cases, chiefly in
states which had earlier dicta requiring
an intent to inflict injury for battery.
This device made it easy to bring the
law of those states into line with the
weight of authority, without purport-
ing to overrule the earlier cases. The
language used here is identical with
52Young v. State, 120 Tex. Cr. Rep. 39, 47 S. W.
2d 320 (1932).
53 1 Houst. (Del.) 62 (1858).
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that used in Hul~s Case,5' the early
negligent manslaughter case, to per-
form the same function of making the
transition from intent to negligence.
(c) Basing a Battery Conviction on
Recklessness.
The fore-runner to this important
group of cases is State v. Myers,5 de-
cided in Iowa in 1865. The case itself
is not adequately reported, but it ap-
pears that the defendant was indicted
and convicted for "assault with intent
to inflict bodily injury" under Iowa
Code (1851) §2594. The conviction was
affirmed, the court approving an in-
struction summarized in the opinion as
follows: "Recklessly shooting into a
crowd, and wounding some one not in-
tended, is criminal." One may suppose
that there was in fact an intent to in-
jure someone, although not the person
actually wounded, but be that as it may,
the language above quoted was of con-
siderable importance in the develop-
ment of the law of battery. The case
was cited in 1874 by Wharton, for the
proposition, new to that text, that
"Recklessly shooting into a crowd is an
assault."56 From here it passed into
general currency, and was cited for this
proposition in a number of later cases.
Four years later the Georgia court
held in Collier v. State7 that one who
shot a pistol at another, "intending, at
the time, to shoot at him, not caring
whether he hit him or not," was guilty
54 J. Kelyng 40, 84 Eng. Repr. 1072 (1664). See
supra, p. 135.
5 19 Iowa 517 (1865).
a6 2 Wharton, Criminal Law (7th Ed., 1874) 213.
57 Collier v. State, 39 Ga. 31 (1869). This aston-
ishing decision was finally overruled in Wright
v. State, 168 Ga. 690, 148 S. E. 731 (1929).
of an assault with intent to murder
where the pistol ball hit the victim in
the thigh, even though, as the court ad-
mitted, the defendant may not affirma-
tively have intended to kill or even to
wound. A number of years later, in
1893, the same court stated that "there
are wanton or reckless states of mind
which are sometimes the equivalent of
a specific intention to kill" in Gallery v.
State, 8 and although the earlier case
was not cited, its influence must have
been felt to some extent.
The Georgia court later reversed a
conviction for the statutory offence of
"shooting at another with a gun" un-
der Georgia Penal Code §115 in Wolfe
v. State, 9 but there is a clear intima-
tion in the case that "criminal negli-
gence will supply the place of intent"
for that crime, which is of course close-
ly analogous to a common law battery.
There is also the early Pennsylvania
case of Smith v. Commonwealth," in
which a conviction for assault and bat-
tery and for the aggravated assault of
"unlawfully and maliciously inflicting
upon another person, either with or
without any weapon or instrument, any
grievous bodily harm" was affirmed, in
the face of a finding of the jury by spe-
cial verdict that the defendant had dis-
charged his pistol and wounded some-
one in a train "with the intent to shoot
into the floor, and not with the intent
to injure the prosecutor or any other
person." The Supreme Court held that
58 92 Ga. 463, 17 S. E. 863 (1893). See the dis-
cussion of the later Georgia aggravated assault
cases, infra, p. 15.
5 121 Ga. 587, 49 S. E. 688 (1905).
60100 Pa. 324 (1882), aff'd sub nom. Com. v.
Lister, 15 Phila. 405 (1882).
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the act was "recklessly and wilfully
done" and that from this "the law will
imply malice." Reg. v. Martin6 1 was the
only case cited by the court on the
point, and the court declined to apply
the cases cited by the defendant hold-
ing that an intent to injure was nec-
essary for an assault without injury.
The essential similarity between bat-
tery and manslaughter was the basis of
the famous Massachusetts decision in
Commonwealth v. Hawkins,62 in which
a conviction for assault and battery
with a dangerous weapon was affirmed
where the defendant had fired a pistol
"in a grossly careless and negligent
manner, or in a wanton and careless
manner, and by so doing wounded
Mary A. Powers." The court said: 63
"In the case at bar, if Mary A. Powers
had died from the pistol shot, the de-
fendant, on the facts found by the jury,
would have been guilty of manslaughter.
As she survived the injury, the same
principle now requires a conviction of
assault and battery. There has been
much discussion in the cases in regard
to the nature of the intent necessary to
constitute this crime, but the better
opinion is that nothing more is required
than an intentional doing of an act
which, by reason of its wanton or
grossly negligent character, exposes an-
other to personal injury, and causes
such an injury."
The reckless and wilful discharge of
a revolver at the ground while chasing
a boy, without intent to do bodily in-
jury, was held sufficient in State v.
Surry, 64 a Washington case, to sustain
a conviction for simple assault and bat-
tery where the bullet glanced from the
61 14 Cox C. C. 633 (1881), supra, p. 138.
62 157 Mass. 551, 32 N. E. 862 (1893).
63157 Mass. 553.
64 23 Wash. 655, 63 Pac. 557 (1900).
65 19 Iowa 517 (1865), supra, p. 143.
sidewalk and hit the fugitive. But the
court approved an acquittal of the ag-
gravated crime of "assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to do bodily
injury." The court cited and relied on
State v. Myers 5 as far as simple assault
and battery was concerned.
The doctrine that gross carelessness
"implying an indifference to conse-
quences" in handling a gun is enough
for battery was expressly adopted by
the Supreme Court of Alabama in
Medley v. State,6 even though the de-
fendant had not intentionally dis-
charged his rifle "at a place where it
was likely some person would be hit."
The Court of Appeals in the later case
of McGee v. State,67 interpreting the
earlier decision in the light of the rec-
ord which was available to it, said that
what was required was "that the de-
fendant designedly did an act calcu-
lated to produce bodily harm to an-
other," and was unwilling to apply it
to a case where the defendant's shot-
gun had been accidentally discharged,
but even this constituted a recognition
that no intent to injure was needed for
a battery. The Court of Appeals was
thus going back to the presumed intent
doctrine of the Sloanaker case.
66
The last of the decisions on this ques-
tion before 1912 is Tyner v. United
States.6 The defendant was convicted
in the Indian Territory for assault
with intent to kill, where he had fired
his pistol "recklessly or heedlessly
* * * or while running his horse at
66 156 Ala. 78, 47 So. 218 (1908).
67 4 Ala. App. 54, 58 So. 1008 (1912).
66 1 Houst. (Del.) 62 (1858), supra, p. 142.
69 2 Okla. Cr. 689, 103 Pac. 1057 (1909).
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an unusual rate of speed along the
street" (the latter was a statutory mis-
demeanor), striking a boy walking
nearby. The court affirmed the convic-
tion upon the ground that if death had
resulted, the defendant would have
been guilty of manslaughter.70 The de-
cision was undoubtedly correct as to
simple assault and battery, but is op-
posed to the weight of authority as far
as the proof of the intent to kill is con-
cerned.71
It was against the background of all
these criminal cases that the first auto-
mobile battery case based upon reck-
lessness was decided in Indiana in
1912.72 But the large number of de-
cisions recognizing liability for reck-
lessness long before the automobile
became a problem is not yet wholly
complete. For another source may also
be drawn upon-civil actions of tres-
pass for assault and battery provided
an analogy which was not without its
effect upon the courts. Although there
may at one time have been absolute
civil liability for a trespass to the per-
son, without intention or negligence, if
the injury was direct,78 yet as early as
1616 the defence of inevitable accident
was accepted, if "the defendant had
committed no negligence to give occa-
sion to the hurt.""' The negligence re-
quired to establish liability was fixed
in some jurisdictions as "the want of
70 The court also stated that the same facts
would make out an assault "with a deadly wea-
pon with intent to inflict on the person of another
a bodily injury" under Ind. Terr. Stat. (1899)§909. See infra, p. 153.
71 See the Illinois cases discussed infra, p. 152.
Contra, Gallery V. State, 92 Ga. 463, 17 S. E. 863
(1893); State v. Taylor, 70 Vt. 1, 39 Atl. 447 (189).
72Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 98 N. R. 640
(1912).
exercise of due care" as early as 1850.75
But in other states the same test for a
civil trespass as for a criminal prosecu-
tion was accepted where the declara-
tion alleged an assault and battery, and
a recovery under such a declaration
was denied where negligence alone was
proved.
Typical of these latter jurisdictions
was Indiana, and the Supreme Court of
that state, as early as 1889 in Mercer v.
Corbin,78 held that a civil assault and
battery could be predicated upon in-
jury arising out of "recklessness and
wanton disregard of human life and
safety" from which "malice and crim-
inal intent" might be inferred, although
there was "no actual or specific intent"
to commit an assault and battery. Civil
and criminal cases were cited indis-
criminately, the criminal cases includ-
ing Commonwealth v. Lister" and
State v. Myers,8 and the manslaughter
case of Flinni v. State.79 A verdict for
plaintiff was affirmed upon the ground
that the defendant had ridden his bi-
cycle down the footpath in violation of
a statute and in "wrongful and reckless
disregard of the rights of others."
Reckless Battery by Automobile
We are at last in a position to judge
whether or not the Indiana court by
its decision in Lutherv. State"0 was cre-
ating a legal innovation in 1912 when
78 Anonymous, Y. B. Edw. IV, 7 P1. 18 (1466).
74 Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134 (1616).
75 Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 292 (1850).
78 U7 Ind. 450, 20 N. E. 132 (1889).
77 15 Phila. 405 (1882), supra, p. 134.
78 19 Iowa 517 (1865), supra, p. 143.
7 24 Ind. 286 (1865).
80 177 Ind. 619, 98 N. E. 640 (1912).
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it predicated liability for a criminal
battery on the reckless use of an auto-
mobile. Did it do so in order to make
possible the imposition of a maximum
penalty of $1,000 fine and 6 months in
the county jail for assault and battery,81
when the maximum for the first offense
of reckless driving was a fine of $50?82
Or was the court simply following out
the common law development which
had already taken place in Alabama,
Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Massachu-
setts, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Wash-
ington, and (in a civil case) in Indiana
itself, following the manslaughter anal-
ogy?
The question for decision was wheth-
er the evidence sustained a conviction
for assault and battery under Burns
Ind. Stat. (1908) §2242, providing
"Whoever, in a rude, insolent or angry
manner, unlawfully touches another, is
guilty of assault and battery." Defend-
ant's automobile, while passing a street
car on the left hand side, had hit a bi-
cyclist who was riding between him and
the street car and who had suddenly
turned out in front of him. The court
reversed the conviction upon the
ground that there was no evidence of
"a reckless disregard for the safety of
others indicating a willingness to inflict
injury" from which the jury might
properly draw "the inference that ap-
pellant intended to injure" the bicy-
clist, but said in the course of its opin-
ion: 83
"The evidence in this case establishes
the collision, and the hurt of Wiesehan
by the force of it, and is therefore a rude
81 Burns Ind. Stat. (1908) §2242.
82 Burns Ind. Stat. (1908) §10465, 10476.
83 177 Ind. 625-26.
touching of another. Inteni on the part
of the person charged, to apply the force
constituting the battery, is, however, an
essential element of the offense and
must be shown to make the touching
criminally unlawful. 2 Greenleaf, Evi-
dence (16th ed.) §83; 5 Am. and Eng.
Ency. Law and Pr. 680; Underhill, Crim.
Ev. (2d ed.) §354; Vanvactor v. State
(1888), 113 Ind. 276, 280, 15 N. E. 341, 3
Am. St. 645; Perkins v. Stein & Co.
(1893), 94 Ky. 433, 22 S. W. 649, 20 L. R.
A. 861.
"But the intent may be inferred from
circumstances which legitimately permit
it. Intent to injure may not be implied
from a lack of ordinary care. It may be
from intentional acts, where the injury
was the direct result of them, done un-
der circumstances showing a reckless
disregard for the safety of others, and a
willingness to inflict the injury or the
commission of an unlawful act which
leads directly and naturally to the in-
jury. Underhill, Crim. Ev., supra; note
to Johnson v. State, 66 Ohio St., 59, 63
N. E. 607; Banks v. Braman (1905), 188
Mass. 367, 74 N. E. 594; State v. Camp-
bell, 82 Conn. 671, 74 Atl. 927; Mercer v.
Corbin (1889), 117 Ind. 450, 20 N. E.
132, 3 L. R. A. 221, 10 Am. St. 76; Rey-
nolds v. Pierson (1902), 29 Ind. App.
273, 64 N. E. 484; Palmer v. Chicago,
etc. R. Co. (1887), 112 Ind. 250, 14 N.E.
70; Parker v. Pennsylvania Co. (1893),
134 Ind. 673, 34 N. E. 504, 23 L. R. A.
552; Fisher v. Louisville, etc. R. Co.
(1897), 146 Ind. 558, 45 N. E. 689."
The following of the manslaughter
analogy is clearly shown by the citation
of State v. Campbell,84 a case of auto-
mobile manslaughter through gross
negligence (although charged in the in-
dictment both as an assault causing
death and as a killing by gross negli-
gence). The court was also relying on
Mercer v. Corbin, 5 which, although a
civil case, had cited several of the ear-
84 82 Conn. 671, 74 AtI. 927 (1909).
85 117 Ind. 450, 20 N. E. 132 (1889), supra, p. 145.
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lier criminal reckless battery cases. It
is hard to see how any other decision
could have been more in accord with
the precedents, although, perhaps due
to the peculiar wording of the Indiana
battery statute requiring a "rude"
touching, it was necessary to couch the
decision in terms of implied intent to
injure, as was done in the Sioanaker
case/a and for that matter, in Hull's
Case. 87
Professor Tulin has criticized the
New Jersey court which decided the
1916 case of State v. Schutte8 for citing
earlier non-automobile cases holding
that there could be a reckless assault
and battery. The court decided that
intentionally driving a car "under cir-
cumstances that rendered likely the in-
fliction of such an injury as that which
actually resulted from it" was equiva-
lent to the "intention to inflict injury"
which is of the essence of criminal as-
sault. Professor Tulin says: "It is thus
seen that not a single one of the auth-
orities cited has any resemblance to the
problem of determining whether the
penalty fixed by the legislature for
reckless driving should be increased by
holding the defendant guilty of assault
and battery."''
But it is submitted that neither the
New Jersey court in this case, nor the
Indiana court in the Luther case, was
determining, or should have deter-
mined, any such problem. The proper
pejalty for a criminal, act is a matter
for the legislature under modern penal
codes. The only question properly be-
fore either court was whether or not
so 1 Houzt. (Del.) 62 (1858), supra, p. 142.
87J. Kelyng 40, 84 Eng. Repr. 1072 (1664),
supr, p. 135.
the defendant's acts constituted a bat-
tery. The circumlocution and the talk
of "imputed intent" was due to the
court's natural (but not necessarily
laudable) desire to avoid the appear-
ance of overruling earlier dicta in each
state. Both courts recognized that
American decisions in the previous half
century had broadened the concept of
battery, although indeed there appear
to have been no decisions prior to 1850
denying liability for recklessness.
Undoubtedly it is no mere coinci-
dence that the automobile cases occur
in states in which the penalty for as-
sault and battery is greater than that
for reckless driving. But this is not
because this factor has or should have
influenced the courts. A court can only
decide the cases which are argued be-
fore it. Obviously, in a state in which
the penalty for assault and battery is
no greater than for reckless driving,
there is no point in prosecuting a de-
fendant for assault and battery, and no
prosecuting attorney will bring such a
case in one of these states. The only
inference to be drawn from Professor
Tulin's imposing table of statutory pen-
alties for reckless driving and simple
assault and battery concerns the exer-
cise of "The District Attorney's Op-
tion," and considerations of relative
penalties cannot be said to have moved
the courts in any of these battery cases.
Attempts to state the type of reckless
conduct which is sufficient for a crim-
inal battery, and the terms in which the
issue should be left to the jury, have
led to some confusion in automobile
88 87 N. J. L. 15, 93 AL. 112 (1915), af'd 88 N. J.
L. 396, 96 At. 659 (1916).
89 Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048 at 1063.
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cases. On the whole, however, these
cases hang together more consistently
than do the cases of recklessness in
other fields, for there are not many dif-
ferent types of reckless conduct possi-
ble in connection with the use of auto-
mobiles.
There is no substantial difference in
the conduct required for liability in
states which use the language of "im-
puted intent," and in other states which
avoid this fiction. The intent is "im-
puted by law" from reckless conduct
and the jury is not required to infer the
existence of an actual intent to do in-
jury. °
The most usual definition of the con-
duct and state of mind required for lia-
90 Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165
(1927); Com. v. Kalb, 129 Pa. Super, 241, 195 Atl.
428 (1938); Radley v. State, 197 Ind. 200, 150 N. E.
97 (1926); Woodward v. State, 164 Miss. 468, 144
So. 895 (1932); People v. Hopper, 69 Colo. 124,
169 Pac. 152 (1917). In People v. Vasquez, 85 Cal.
App. 575, 259 Pac. 1005 (1927) the court holds the
defendant to have "intended the natural and
probable consequence of his unlawful and reck-
less act." In the early Indiana cases, a "willing-
ness to injure" would be imputed from reckless
conduct. See quotation from Luther v. State,
supra, p. 146.
91 This definition, with some slight modifica-
tions in phraseology, is adopted in Brimhall v.
State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165 (1927); People v.
Hopper, 69 Colo. 124, 169 Pac. 152 (1917); Maloney
v. State, 57 Ga. App. 265, 195 S. E. 209 (1938);
Radley v. State, 197 Ind. 200, 150 N. E. 97 (1926);
Woodward v. State, 164 Miss. 468, 144 So. 895
(1932); State v. Agnew, 202 N. C. 755, 164 S. E.
578 (1932); Com. v. Kalb, 129 Pa. Super. 241, 195
Atl. 428 (1938); Davis v. Com., 150 Va. 611, 143 S. E.
641 (1928). A similar result has been reached
under the Missouri and New York statutes re-
quiring "culpable negligence." State v. Sawyers,
336 Mo. 644, 80 S. W. 2d 164 (1935) overruling State
v. Miller, 234 S. W. 813 (Mo. Sup. 1921); People v.
Waxman, 232 App. Div. 90, 249 N. Y. S. 180 (1st
Dept. 1931).
92 State v. Hamburg, 4 W. W. Har. (34 Del.) 62,
143 Atl. 47 (1928), a nisi prius case; Com. v.
Temple, 239 Ky. 188, 39 S. W. 2d 228 (1931).
93 Pierce v. Com., 214 Ky. 454, 283 S. W. 418
(1926); cf. State v. Richardson, 179 Iowa 770, 162
N. W. 28 (1917).
94 State v. Lancaster, 208 N. C. 349, 180 S. E.
577 (1935). Under the earlier Pennsylvania
bility is this: "The defendant's acts
must be so (wanton) or (reckless) as
to show a (reckless) or (utter) disre-
gard for the safety of others.""' It is
rarely safe for a trial court to leave the
question to the jury in less comprehen-
sive terms. In a few states "reckless-
ness" accompanied by gross negli-
gence92 or by an unlawful act" is all
that is required, but "recklessness or
carelessness" alone is not sufficient.9'
It is well settled that negligence of a
character barely sufficient to support
civil liability is not enough in any
state,9" unless a statute specifically pro-
vides otherwise.9 6
The fact that the battery results from
an unlawful act is also of importance.
If the unlawful act is malum in se,97 or
decisions, "wantonness or recklessness" was
enough. Com. v. Gayton, 69 Pa. Super. 513 (1918).
Now a "reckless disregard of safety" must be
proved. Com. v. Kalb, 129 Pa. Super. 241, 195 Atl.
428 (1938). Of course, in any jurisdiction, if the
defendant is not even guilty of "reckless driv-
ing," he should not be convicted of assault and
battery. State v. Rawlings, 191 N. C. 265, 131 S.
E. 632 (1929).
95 Ordinarily the language used by the trial
court is vastly different from that applicable to
the torts cases. If the trial judge has used torts
language in his charge, or if the evidence does
not sustain a finding of more than ordinary neg-
ligence, the conviction should be reversed. Peo-
ple v. Anderson, 310 Ill. 389, 141 N. E. 727 (1923);
Radley v. State, 197 Ind. 200, 150 N. E. 97 (1926);
Woodward v. State, 164 Miss. 468, 144 So. 895
(1932); State v. Albertalli, 112 Atl. 724 (N. J.,
1915); State v. Lancaster, 208 N. C. 349, 180 S. E.
577 (1935). There is a statement by a dissenting
judge in State v. Sussewell, 149 S. C. 128, 146 S. E.
697 (1929) to the effect that simple negligence
would be enough for a conviction of assault and
battery, but the majority does not discuss the
point, as the case involved an aggravated assault.
98 The Texas statute originally required "gross
negligence" but no more than ordinary neg-
ligence appears to be now required. See supra,
p. 142.
97 King v. State, 157 Tenn. 635, 11 S. W. 2d 904
(1928). In the states which make this distinction,
an unlawful act merely malum prohibitum is of
course not qnough. State v. Rawlings, 191 N. C.
265, 131 S. E. 632 (1929). The nature of this dis-
tinction is far from clear, and it has come in for
a great deal of criticism. See note, (1930) 30 Col.
L. Rev. 74. But so long as it is administered in
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a proximate cause of the battery,9 or
accompanied by negligence,9 it has
been held in a few states to be a suffi-
cient basis for liability, and in Ohio
any unlawful act resulting in injury is
enough. 100 In any event, the commis-
sion of an unlawful act is usually re-
garded as some evidence of negligence,
to be considered with all the other cir-
cumstances by the jury in determining
whether or not the requisite degree of
recklessness is found.10 1
Whether or not the defendant was
actually aware of the risk which his
reckless conduct was creating is rarely
an issue in these cases. Most sober men
will not drive in a reckless manner
without being conscious of the risk they
are creating.10 2 What few intimations
there are seem to say that it is not
necessary for the defendant to have
known of the dangerous tendency of
his acts, if he "ought to have known"'10
terms of dangerousness of the act, which seems
to be the modem tendency, it may serve a useful
purpose.
98 State v. Agnew, 202 N. C. 755, 164 S. E. 578
(1932).
O9 People v. Saroff, 227 App. Div. 114, 237 N. Y.
S. 73 (2d Dept. 1929), under a statute requiring
"culpable negligence." In some states there
must also be proof of recklessness, and the com-
mission of the unlawful act does not seem to add
much to the case. Brinhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522,
255 Pac. 165 (1927); Davis v. Com., 150 Va. 611,
143 S. E. 641 (1928).
100 Keuhn v. State, 37 Ohio App. 217, 174 N. E.
606 (1930); Fishwick v. State, 14 Ohio C. C. (N.
S.) 368, 33 Ohio C. D. 63 (1911).
101 Singer v. State, 194 Ind. 397, 142 N. E. 864
(1924); State v. Schutte, 88 N. J. L. 396, 96 AtI.
659 (1916); Com. v. Gayton, 69 Pa. Super. 513
(1918).
102 In Woodward v. State, 164 Miss. 468, 144 So.
895 (1932) the defendant had carelessly started
his automobile and ran into a woman standing
just in front of him. He claimed that he did not
see her standing there and the trial court charged
the jury that he was guilty if he could have seen
her "by reasonable diligence." The conviction
was affirmed, but the upper court did not pass on
the correctness of this instruction, since the evi-
dence clearly indicated that he had in fact seen
or if a "reasonably careful person doing
the same act would have been guilty of
a conscious disregard of life."' 0' It
seems clear that intoxication does not
excuse but rather aggravates the type
of recklessness required for liability."'0 5
One troublesome procedural problem
remains. If the defendant has been in-
dicted for some kind of aggravated as-
sault, and the indictment does not in-
clude.an express charge of battery, the
jury may bring in a verdict of "guilty
of simple assault." A few courts hold
that the aggravated assault charge does
not include a battery and that the ver-
dict must be supported as a verdict for
an assault or not at all. ° 6 Under these
circumstances, a conviction for assault
has been affirmed where the undis-
puted evidence showed that physical
injury had, resulted, and the intent re-
quired for the assault has been imputed
from recklessness, as in the case of a
her. In Tift v. State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S. E. 41
(1916), the defendant was convicted where he
had suffered an attack of vertigo while driving
his automobile, but the jury found, under the
court's charge, that he knew he was subject to
frequent attacks of this character.
. 03 Radley v. State, 197 Ind. 200, 150 N. E. 97
(1926).
101 State v. Sawyers, 336 Mo. 644, 80 S. W. 2d 164
(1935), under a statute requiring "culpable neg-
ligence."
105 Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165
(1927); Mundy v. State, 59 Ga. App. 509, 1 S. E.
2d 605 (1939); Chambliss v. State, 37 Ga. App.
124, 139 S. E. 80 (1927); Com. v. Gayton, 69 Pa.
Super. 513 (1918); Davis v. Coin. 150 Va. 611, 143
S. E. 641 (1928). If driving while intoxicated is
regarded as a crime nalum in se, a conviction
may be warranted on this, without proof of reck-
lessness. King v. State, 157 Tenn. 635, 11 S. W. 2d
904 (1928). Prior to the automobile cases it had
also been held that intoxication was no defense
to simple assault and battery. Whitten v. State,
115 Ala. 72, 22 So. 483 (1896).
1(0 People v. Hopper, 69 Colo. 124, 169 Pac. 152
(1917); People v. Vasquez, 85 Cal. App. 575, 259
Pac. 1005 (1927) (by implication). Contra: State
v. Sudderth, 184 N. C. 753, 114 S. E. 828 (1922);
Maloney v. State, 57 Ga. App. 265, 195 S. E. 209
(1938) (by implication).
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battery. 1'0 The same result has been
reached where the defendant was in-
dicted for "assault and battery" and the
jury has convicted him of "simple as-
sault" only, although the undisputed
evidence showed the commission of a
battery. 0 8 These decisions represent an
extreme instance of the policy of the
law of upholding convictions for a les-
ser crime than that proved by the evi-
dence where the defendant has, through
the technicalities of pleading or by a
compromise verdict, been let off more
lightly than he deserved."0 9
Aggravated Assault by Automobile
As their name implies, the aggra-
vated assault cases usually arise under
statutes phrased in terms of "assault"
plus various accompanying circum-
stances which justify the increased
penalty." 0 Yet in every one of the auto-
mobile cases there has been actual
physical injury, amounting to an ad-
mitted battery. Should the court per-
mit the battery to take the place of the
required assault, if there has been no
actual intent to injure or alarm, as is
required for an assault without physi-
cal injury? In two cases the court felt
that all the requirements of a technical
"assault" had to be met, but in one of
107 People v. Vasquez and People v. Hopper,
supra, n. 106.
108 Com. v. Bergdoll, 55 Pa. Super. 186 (1913).
109 See (1935) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 340. As an as-
sault is usually defined, both at common law
and under codes, as an "attempted battery," the
most that has been done is to permit indictment
and conviction for the attempt, where the evi-
dence showed the commission of the completed
crime. This is expressly permitted in a number
of states by statute. Cal. Penal Code §663; Idaho
Code (1932) §17-305; Nev. Comp. L. (1929)
§9975 (2); N. Y. Penal Code §260; N. Dak. Comp.
L. (1913) §10337; Utah R. S. (1933) §103-1-29.
110 This is true even in the Texas statute ex-
them the intent was "imputed" from
recklessness, 1' and in the other, in
which recklessness did not clearly ap-
pear, the existence of an assault was
doubted. 112 In the remaining automo-
bile cases in which a conviction for ag-
gravated assault has been upheld, the
court has not discussed the matter.
There should be no question about lia-
bility, for the main considerations of
policy leading to a conviction for an ag-
gravated "assault" apply even more
strongly where there has been an ac-
tual battery, although without the com-
mission of a technical "assault."
Whether personal injury crimes be
punished primarily on the retributive
or the deterrent theory, there are at
least three possible aggravating fac-
tors in punishing an act causing injury
or death: (1) The amount of injury
actually caused; (2) the amount of in-
jury risked; and (3) the amount of in-
jury intended." 3 In the law of homi-
cide, which developed early at the com-
mon law, and which has been the sub-
ject of much legislation in America,
these factors are nicely taken care of.
The common law of England never de-
veloped a felonious assault or battery
(with the exception of mayhem, which
ceased to be a felony in early times) 14
pressly creating an aggravated "assault" based
upon the negligent driving of a motor vehicle
or a motorcycle which collides with or causes in-
jury to another. See infra, p. 152.
I Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165
(1927). See infra, p. 151.
112 People v. Smith, 217 Mich. 669, 187 N. W.
304 (1922).
1s See L. Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sen-
tences on Appeal, (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 521 at
537-38; Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the
Law of Homicide, (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 701, 1261
at 1264-77.
114 Corn. v. Newell, 7 Mass. 245 (1810).
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and the common law penalty of unlim-
ited imprisonment, at the discretion of
the court, for a misdemeanor, did not
require statutory intervention unless a
capital punishment or transportation
was desired as the penalty.
But in America, a relatively low
maximum punishment for misdemean-
ors, and particularly for simple assault
and batterS, was set by the legislature
in most states. Doubtless this was one
step in the deflation of the judge's
power which followed the Revolution.
Hence, aggravated assaults were cre-
ated by the legislature with more seri-
ous punishments, and some or all of
these factors of aggravation were util-
ized as the basis of classification. To
what extent may they properly be ap-
plied to injuries caused by the reckless
driving of an automobile?
(a) Aggravated Assault Based on
Infliction of Serious Injury
It is clear that such a crime requires
no intent to injure for conviction. For
instaince, the Arizona statute provides
a more serious penalty for an assault
"when a serious injury is inflicted,"
and a reckless disregard for the safety
of others is enough, if such injury is
caused thereby. 1 5 Likewise the Penn-
sylvania statute requires only that the
defendant "unlawfully and maliciously.
inflict grievous bodily harm," and the
115 Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165
(1927).
11 The decision to this effect in Smith v. Com.,
100 Pa. 324 (1882), where a pistor was used, has
been followed in the later automobile cases.
Corn. v. Coccodralli, 74 Pa. Super. 324 (1920);
Com. v. Donnelly, 113 Pa. Super. 173, 172 AtI. 190
(1934); Com. v. Kalb, 129 Pa. Super. 241, 195 At.
428 (1938).
217 State v. McKetterick, 14 S. C. 346 (1880).
same recklessness which will support a
conviction for assault and battery if
slight harm is done, will support the
three year penalty under the statute if
"grievous bodily harm" has resulted.1 6
Although there is no Atatutory defini-
tion of an "assault of a high and aggra-
vated nature" in South Carolina, the
infliction of serious bodily harm was
enough to justify a conviction before
the automobile came upon the scene"'
and in an automobile case such harm
recklessly inflicted is also sufficient."8
A similar result is reached under the
Missouri statute on felonious wound-
ing, requiring "culpable negligence"
from which the victim "be maimed,
wounded, or disfigured, or receive great
bodily harm or his life be endanger-
ed."1'19
(b) Aggravated Assault Based Upon
the Use of a Deadly or Dangerous
Weapon.
By similar reasoning, if there has
been sufficient recklessness to consti-
tute a battery, and the defendant has
been reckless with a deadly or danger-
ous weapon, causing actual injury, all
the elements of this type of aggravated
assault are present. There was at least
one decision to this effect before the
automobile cases were decided. 20
Whether or not an automobile is a
deadly weapon is at least a jury ques-
118 State v. Sussewell, 149 S. C. 128, 146 S. E.
697 (1929).
119 Supra, p. 138. It was applied to automobile
drivers in State v. Miller, 234 S. W. 813 (Mo.
Sup. 1921) and State v. Sawyers, 336 Mo. 644, 80
S. W. 2d 164 (1935). In the latter case the convic-
tion was reversed for an error in the trial court's
instruction as to degree of negligence required.
12 COm. v. Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551, 32 N. E. 862
(1893). In People v. Sullivan, 4 N. Y. Cr. 193 (5th
Dept. 1885), supra, p. 140, there was no actual
battery committed with the deadly weapon.
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tion,"1' and if it is found to be such, a
conviction is justified if there was an
intent to inflict injury, ' or extreme
recklessness,' or the unlawful and
reckless operation of the automobile, as
in State v. Sudderth.'
24
The Sudderth case has been cited as
a conviction for "assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill" under N.
Ca. Cons. St. 1919 §4214,125 but the re-
port of the case mentions only "assault
with a deadly weapon," and the con-
viction was unquestionably for this, as
§4215 provides:
"In all cases of an assault, with or
without intent to kill or injure, the per-
son convicted shall be punished by fine
or imprisonment or both, at the discre-
tion of the court: Provided, that where
no deadly weapon has been used and no
serious damage done, the punishment in
assaults, assaults and batteries, and af-
frays, shall not exceed a fine of fifty dol-
lars or imprisonment for thirty days;
It should be noted further that there
may be a conviction of assault under
§4215 "without intent to injure," by the
express language of the statute.
Analytically, the Texas aggravated
assault statute is of this type. No cir-
cumstance of aggravation is required
by the statute except the use of a dan-
gerous instrumentality, the statute now
punishing: 2
"Any driver or operator of a motor
121 Williamson v. State, 92 Fla. 980, 111 So. 124,
53 A. L. R. 250 (1926); State v. Stringer, 140 Ore.
452, 13 P. 2d 340 (1932).
122 State v. Stringer, supra, n. 121. No facts
are given in Williamson v. State, supra, n. 121,
from which one may judge whether the convic-
tion for assault with a dangerous weapon with-
out intent to kill was affirmed on the basis of
recklessness or on the basis of an intentional
assault.
123 In People v. Goolsby, 284 Mich. 375, 279 N. W.
867 (1938) the defendant had been stopped by a
policeman. He told the policeman to get out of
his way and then started driving without looking
vehicle or motorcycle [who] shall wil-
fully or with negligence, as is defined in
the Penal Code of this State in the title
and chapter on negligent homicide, col-
lide with or cause injury less than death
to any other person."
In a few states the statute creating
this type of aggravated assault based
primarily upon the use of a deadly or
dangerous weapon has also specifically
required "an intent to inflict bodily
harm." The ordinary interpretation of
such a statute would eliminate any
conviction based solely upon reckless-
ness, and Colorado has so held .
27
But Professor Tulin has pointed out
a contrary result in llinois, 128 which he
explained upon the ground that the
maximum penalty for both reckless
driving and simple assault and battery
was a fine of $100, whereas this aggra-
vated assault carried a maximum fine
of $1,000 or imprisonment for 1 year or
both. The court, he felt, was willing to
stretch the law to convict for the ag-
gravated assault where the penalty for
simple assault and battery was no
greater than that for reckless driving.1
29
The Illinois statute10 under which
the prosecution was brought punished
any:
"Assault with a deadly weapon, in-
strument, or other thing, with an intent
to inflict upon the person of another
bodily injury, where no considerable
to see whether or not the latter had done so.
124 184 N. C. 753, 114 S. E. 828 (1922).
1225 Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048 at 1068.
126 Vernon's Texas Penal Code (1936) Art. 1149
(as amended in 1939). The punishment is a fine
of $25 to $1,000 or imprisonment from 1 month to
2 years, or both.
227 People v. Hopper, 69 Colo. 124, 169 Pac. 152
(1917).
128 People v. Benson, 321 IMI. 605, 152 N. E. 514
(1926).
129 Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048 at 1068.
120 Criminal Code §25; Jones Ill. Stat (1936)
§37.039.
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provocation appears or where the cir-
cumstances of the assault show an aban-
doned and malignant heart."
Another statute provided a penalty of
imprisonment from 1 to 14 years for
"an assault with an intent to commit
murder," including an "attempt to com-
mit murder by any means.1131 These
statutes originated together as the first
and second parts, respectively, of §52,
c. 30, of the Illinois Revised Statutes of
1845. When the automobile cases under
the first-quoted part of this section
came up for decision in the Appellate
Court of Illinois, there were earlier
cases involving reckless use of pistols
in the Supreme Court holding that the
intent to murder under the second part
of the section might be made out from
"an act committed deliberately and
likely to be attended with dangerous
consequences."'3 2 It was therefore an
a fortiori case to convict of the lesser
offence and to find an "intent to inflict
injury" from the reckless use of an
automobile.133  In a later automobile
case in the Supreme Court, the statute
was construed as requiring a conviction
if the crime would have constituted
manslaughter from recklessness, had
the victim died.13 4
Since the publication of Professor
131 Criminal Code §§23, 24; Jones Ill. Stat.
(1936) §37.037 and 37.038.
132 Perry v. People, 14 I1. 496 (1853); Dunaway
v. People, 110 Ill. 333 (1884). The same test has
been used in recent non-automobile cases. Peo-
ple v. Wilson, 342 Ill. 358, 174 N. E. 398 (1931);
People v. Merritt, 367 Ill. 521, 12 N. E. 2d 7 (1937).
'33 People v. Clink, 216 Ill. App. 357 (1920).
234 People v. Anderson, 310 IM. 389, 141 N. E.
727 (1923). The later decision in People v. Ben-
son, 321 Ill. 605, 152 N. E. 514 (1926) which Profes-
sor Tulin relied upon, cited no cases, but evi-
dently followed the Anderson case, which had
been decided three years before. The Benson
case was recently cited in Rosenberg v. Ott, 285
Ill. App. 50, 1 N. E. 2d 502 (1936).
Tulin's article, one other state has
reached a similar result. The Oklahoma
statute 5 provides up to 5 years' im-
prisonment for"
"Every person, who, with intent to do
bodily harm, and without justifiable or
excusable cause, commits an assault
upon the person of another with any
sharp or dangerous weapon * * * al-
though without intent to kill such per-
son or to commit any felony."
We have already seen that in 1909, in
a case of reckless shooting, the court
in the Indian Territory (which was
later organized as the state of Okla-
homa) had affirmed a conviction for
an assault with intent to kill or for an
assault "with a deadly weapon with in-
tent to inflict on the person of another
a bodily injury" under the Indian Ter-
ritory statutes,36 upon proof that the
defendant would have been guilty of
murder or manslaughter if the victim
had died. 37 This same line of reason-
ing was carried forward in 1929 by the
Oklahoma court in Winkler v. State.3 8
The commission of the misdemeanor of
speeding was held to supply the "in-
tent to do bodily harm" required by the
present Oklahoma statute, and proof of
culpable negligence made out the as-
sault. Only manslaughter cases were
cited, and the use of the words "justi-
'35 Okla. Comp. Stat. (1921) §1764, now 21 Okla.
Stat. (1937) §652.
26 Indian Terr. Stat. (1899) §909.
37 Tyner v. United States, 2 Okla. Cr. 689, 103
Pac. 1057 (1909), supra, p. 144.
138 45 Okla. Cr. 322, 283 Pac. 591 (1929). At the
time of this decision the penalty for assault and
battery under Okla. Stat. (1921) §1763 was im-
prisonment up to 30 days or fine of $5 to $100 or
both, and the penalty for speeding under Okla.
Laws (1923) c. 16 §2 was imprisonment from 10
to 30 days or fine from $25 to $100 or both for the
first offence, and imprisonment from 30 days to
6 months or fine from $100 to $1000 or both for
the second offence.
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fiable or excusable cause" in the assault
statute, evidently referring to the sta-
tutory homicide test, 39 makes this
analogy not unreasonable. 14
Neither the Illinois nor the Oklahoma
decisions appear fully to support the
thesis that the automobile convictions
resulted from the fact that the reckless
driving and assault and battery penal-
ties were the same. In both states prior
decisions had forecast the result before
the automobile had become a factor in
the situation. Once it was found that
there was a battery aggravated by the
use of a dangerous or deadly weapon,
an automobile, the cases arguably came
within the spirit, if not the letter, of
the statute.
(c) Assault with a Depraved Mind
In Wisconsin there is a statute 4 ' iM-
posing a sentence of 1 to 8 years for
assaulting another:
"In a manner evincing a depraved
mind, regardless of human life, without
any premeditated design to effect the
death of the person assaulted, and under
such circumstances that if death had re-
sulted, the assailant would have been
guilty of murder in the second degree."
The court has held that "culpable gross
negligence" is not enough for convic-
tion under this statute, although it
would warrant a simple assault convic-
tion.1 2 The aggravating feature is the
extreme type of recklessness which
would have justified a murder convic-
139 Okla. Comp. Stat. (1921) §1752, now 21 Okla.
Stat. (1937) §731.
140 In Lane v. State, ... Okla. Cr...., 84 P. 2d
807 (1938), the homicide analogy was drawn upon
in a case involving the accidental discharge of a
gun, and a conviction of the aggravated assault
was affrmed.
141 Wis. Stat. (1921) §4374a.
142 Njecick v. State, 178 Wis. 94, 189 N. W. 147
(1922).
tion at the common law, and of course
negligence sufficient only for man-
slaughter should not suffice. 43 But
there is no requirement of an intent to
cause injury, if injury has in fact re-
sulted.
(d) Assault with Intent to Inflict a
Great Bodily Injury
If the only aggravating feature is this
type of intent, clearly there is no basis
for holding a defendant for reckless-
ness, and the few automobile cases in
which a District Attorney has managed
to secure a conviction of this type, have
been reversed.1' Professor Tulin com-
ments on an Iowa case as follows:
"This means that the court regarded
the penalty for reckless driving (maxi-
mum fine of $100 or imprisonment not
exceeding 30 days) as sufficient."'14
May it not mean that no earlier Iowa
precedents involving non-automobile
cases which would uphold a conviction
were called to the court's attention,14
and that the court was unwilling to
depart from its concept of "intent,"
whatever the consequences may have
been?
(e) Assault with Intent to Murder
Apart from the Georgia cases, there
have been few indictments for assault
with intent to murder by the use of an
automobile which have come before ap-
pellate courts. Most of the defendants
143 See supra, p. 136.
14 State v. Richardson, 179 Iowa 770, 162 N. W.
28 (1917) People v. Smith, 217 Mich. 669, 187 N. W.
304 (1922).
145 Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale I J. 1048 at 1068-69.
146 In State v. Richardson, 179 Iowa 770, 162
N. W. 28 (1917), supra, n. 144, the only Iowa au-
thority which might in any way have justified
the conviction was State v. Myers, 19 Iowa 517(1865), and this case was probably not cited by
counsel, for it was not mentioned in the decision.
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have been acquitted of this offense by
the jury,147 but in Shorter v. State,'"
there was a conviction which was re-
versed on appeal. The court treated the
case like a murder case, and the con-
viction, based solely on the commission
of the misdemeanor of exceeding the
speed limit, of course could not stand
without proof of an intent even to in-
jure.
But the Georgia cases present a dif-
ferent story. There are three cases in
which reckless use of an automobile
has been held to be "an assault with
intent to murder by using any weapon
likely to produce death" under Penal
Code §97, carrying 2 to 10 years' im-
prisonment. It is a fact that the penal-
ties in Georgia for reckless driving and
for simple assault and battery are the
same.1 49 Both are misdemeanors, and
the maximum penalty for a misdemean-
or is a year with the chain gang or 6
months in jail or a fine of $1,000, or all
three. 10 But this would hardly seem
to call for any distortion of the law in
order to inflict an even more serious
penalty upon a reckless driver, no mat-
ter how much damage he has caused.
Indeed, this maximum penalty for sim-
ple assault and battery in Georgia is
greater than that for the same crime in
any other state listed in Professor Tu-
lin's table.' If it is the low penalty
for reckless driving and assault and
147 Williamson v. State, 92 Fla. 980, 111 So. 124,
53 A. L. R. 250 (192); State v. Sussewell, 149 S. C.
128, 146 S. E. 697 (1929); Davis v. Corn., 150 Va.
611, 143 S. E. 641 (1928). But Duhon v. State, 136
Tex. Crim. 404, 125 S. W. 2d 550 (1939), was a
conviction which was affirmed on appeal. The
state's evidence was that the defendant had in-
tentionally run over the victim when she had
refused to accede to his immoral demands, and
from such conduct it was proper for the jury
to find the specific intent to kill required by
the statute.
battery which leads to a conviction for
an aggravated assault, one would ex-
pect Georgia to be the last state to con-
vict of aggravated assault, not one of
the earliest, as it was in fact.
The first automobile conviction under
this Georgia statute was in 1914 in
Dennard v. State. 52 The defendant,
driving a car in good condition, unac-
countably hit a pedestrian who was
walking some distance off the travelled
portion of the road. The verdict of
guilty was held warranted by the evi-
dence, the Court of Appeals saying: 153
"The presumption of malice may arise
from a reckless disregard of human life;
and 'there are wanton or reckless states
of mind which are sometimes the
equivalent of a specific intent to kill,
and which may and should be treated
by the jury as amounting to such inten-
tion when productive of violence likely
to result* in the destruction of life,
though not so resulting in the given in-
stance.' Gallery v. State, 92 Ga. 464, 17
S. E. 863. And see Collier v. State, 39 Ga.
31, 34."
The Gallery case, decided by the
Georgia Supreme Court in 1893, had
held there was no presumption of in-
tent to murder from the use of a deadly
weapon, if death did not result, but had
added the words quoted above, which
were the basis of this decision twenty
years later. 4 The Collier case, decided
in 1869, had gone much further, and
was not overruled until 1929.155
148 147 Tenn. 355, 247 S. W. 985 (1923).
149 Georgia Code (1933) §26-1408 makes battery
a misdemeanor, and §§68-301, 68-307 and 68-9908
make driving at an excessive speed and driving
while intoxicated punishable as misdemeanors.
150 Georgia Penal Code §1065, Code (1933) §27-
2506.
151 Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048 at 1064-65.
15214 Ga. App. 485, 81 S. E. 378 (1914).
1ss 14 Ga. App. 488.
154 Supra, p. 143.
155 See supra, n. 57.
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There were no other Georgia deci-
sions on this point until 1927, when
three cases were decided in the same
division of the Court of Appeals and by
the same three judges, within two
weeks of each other, which took both
sides of the question. In Chambliss v.
State'56 the court, in an opinion by
Luke, J., followed the Dennard case,
and affirmed an aggravated assault con-
viction based upon reckless and unlaw-
ful driving. On the same day Broyles,
J., wrote the opinion of the same court
in Andrews v. State,157 in which the de-
fendant had operated a car with a
smoke screen device which emitted
deadly carbon monoxide and had
caused a pursuing officer to run into
the bank of the road. The court re-
versed the conviction upon the ground
that there was no proof that the de-
fendant knew of the poisonous gas he
was emitting, whereas "the specific in-
tent to kill is a necessary ingredient
of the offense." Twelve days later
Broyles, J., wrote another opinion in
Springer v. State"1 8 in which the court
categorically held that an intentional
assault and battery was needed for
conviction of the aggravated assault,
and reversed a conviction based on
reckless driving.
Then came two cases in which it was
156 37 Ga. App. 124, 139 S. E. 80 (July 14, 1927).
157 37 Ga. App. 95, 138 S. E. 923 (July 14, 1927).
118 37 Ga. App. 154, 139 S. E. 159 (July 26, 1927).
119 Goldin v. State, 38 Ga. App. 110, 142 S. E.
757 (1928); Sudan v. State, 41 Ga. App. 828, 155
S. E. 102 (1930).
160 Smith v. State, 39 Ga. App. 552, 147 S. E. 781
(1929); Neese v. State, 40 Ga. App. 503, 150 S. E.
451 (1929); Gresham v. State, 46 Ga. App. 54, 166
S. E. 443 (1933).
161 Easley v. State, 49 Ga. App. 275, 175 S. E.
23 (1934).
clear that the defendants had inten-
tionally run down their victims in auto-
mobiles,15 9 but no more convictions for
a reckless "assault with intent to mur-
der" were affirmed in Georgia for seven
years. Broyles, J., carried his col-
leagues with him in following the
Springer case in the next three deci-
sions. 6 ' But when the other two judges
resigned, the new majority of the court
in 1934 overruled these cases, going
back to the language of the Supreme
Court in the Gallery case in 1893, to
uphold a conviction for a reckless as-
sault with intent to kill, leaving Broy-
les, J., to dissent. 6' The most recent
case is to the same effect, although a
higher degree of recklessness is re-
quired for the aggravated assault than
the criminal negligence which is all
that is needed for simple assault and
battery.6 2 The problem is one which
should be brought to the attention of
the Supreme Court of Georgia.
The drafting of an indictment for a
Georgia aggravated assault by reckless
use of an automobile has given rise to
some problems. As we have seen, Penal
Code §97 punishes "an assault with in-
tent to murder by using any weapon
likely to produce death." It has been
held that no words in the indictment
which do not charge an "intent to mur-
162 Mundy v. State, 59 Ga. App. 509, 1 S. E. 2d
605 (1939). This case is further remarkable in
that it held extreme intoxication rendering the
defendant unable to manage his car would justify
a conviction of assault with intent to murder,
contrary to the general rule that intoxication
may be a defence if it is so complete as to nega-
tive the specific intent required. People v. Gil-
day, 351111. 11, 183 N. E. 573 (1932). But of course
once the major premise of the Georgia decisions
is adopted, that no intent to murder need be
proved, the intoxication unquestionably does
provide cogent evidence of its substitute, reck-
lessness.
THE RECKLESS MOTORIST
der" will suffice.1 63 But the require-
ment of the use of a "weapon likely to
produce death" has been virtually
eliminated. Anything which a man can
use with intent to kill, will suffice for
conviction, and no allegations charac-
terizing the means used are needed in
the indictment.164
Conclusion
We have found most of the automo-
bile assault and battery cases following
the historical development of battery
in this country which started in 1858
with the Sloanaker case, by which, as
in manslaughter, there may be liabil-
ity for injury recklessly caused. This
development of battery was virtually
completed before the first automobile
case was decided in 1912. Nor does the
relation between the penalties for as-
sault and battery and for reckless driv-
ing appear to have been at all material
in the automobile cases, except in guid-
ing the prosecuting attorney's discre-
tion in selecting the crime for which
to try the defendant.
There are a few exceptions. Liability
for assault has been imposed for reck-
less conduct causing injury, although
ordinarily an assault (as distinguished
from a battery) requires an intent to
injure, or at least to alarm. But these
cases involve no more than interpret-
ing the term "assault" in a statute or
indictment to include also a battery, or
else finding in a reckless battery what-
es In Wright v. State, 168 Ga. 690, 148 S. E. 731
(1929), an indictment charging the infliction of
serious wounds by the operation of an automo-
bile "with a reckless disregard for human life"
was held insufficient, and in Minge v. State, 45
Ga. App. 197, 164 S. E. 68 (1932), an allegation
that an assault was committed "with malice
aforethought" was also held insufficient. But in
Easley v. State, 49 Ga. App. 275,175 S. E. 23 (1934),
ever intent is needed for such an as-
sault. Such interpretation is clearly
reasonable, to correct a legislative mis-
nomer, or to support a verdict for a
lesser crime than that actually proved,
and the policy behind it is clear. Sta-
tutory provisions drafted 75 years ago
to codify the common law as it then
existed should grow with the common
law. If the definition of "assault" in the
aggravated assault statutes were in-
tended to be limited to the assault with-
out a touching which requires an intent
to inflict injury, statutes penalizing an
"assault with a deadly weapon with in-
tent to do harm," as is true in Colorado,
Illinois and Oklahoma, would not have
been drafted with such a tautological
form of expression.16 1
There is a simple solution for this
problem which ought to be adopted in
every state---the enactment of a statute
providing:
"In any criminal case, the word 'as-
sault' in any indictment, information,
warrant, complaint, or other pleading
shall be deemed to include and charge
also a battery. Proof that a defendant
has committed a battery shall be suffi-
cient to sustain a conviction for assault
in any crime in which criminal liability
is predicated, in whole or in part, upon
an assault."
This suggested statute, as far as plead-
ing is concerned, should be added to
§188 of the American Law Institute's
Code of Criminal Procedure.
The second exception is found where
a reckless battery has been held to war-
a conviction for the aggravated assault was af-
firmed where the indictment charged the inflic-
tion of injury with a reckless disregard of human
life "which reckless disregard was the equivalent
of an intent to kill and murder."
184 Wright v. State, 168 Ga. 690, 148 S. E. 731
(1929) (by a divided court), following Monday v.
State, 32 Ga. 672 (1861).
265 See supra, p. 152.
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rant a conviction for an aggravated as-
sault and battery which, by statute,
expressly required an intent to inflict
harm or to murder. This rests upon
the cases from Illinois, Oklahoma and
Georgia, and an ambiguous intimation
in Tennessee. 6 6 In each of the first
three states the automobile cases mere-
ly follow earlier decisions involving
other means of inflicting injury. In
Georgia at least, inadequacy of the pen-
alty for the reckless driver could not
be the reason for his liability for the
aggravated assault-18 months and
$1,000 fine would seem to be enough for
him under any rational view. Opposed
to these cases are decisions denying
liability under somewhat similar sta-
tutes in Colorado, Iowa and Texas.
The early non-automobile cases upon
which the modern Illinois, Oklahoma
and Georgia decisions rest may well
represent an attempt to find a suitable
penalty for a reckless battery aggra-
vated by the infliction of serious injury
or the creation of a great risk through
the use of a deadly weapon, where the
only aggravated assault which the leg-
islature had created required an intent
to harm or murder. As Professor Tulin
has asked, "The function [of penalties]
should be openly expressed. '16T But
166 Shorter v. State, 147 Tenn. 355, 247 S. W.
985 (1923).
167 Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048 at 1069.
168 The penalty was the determining factor in
the search for what "the Legislature must have
intended" in People v. Clark, 242 N. Y. 313, 151
N. E. 631 (1926). As to the importance of the
penalty in the allied problem of mistake of fact,
see Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal
Law, (1939) 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 35, 59, and Sayre,
Public Welfare Offenses, (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev.
55, 83.
169 The Texas statute was passed in 1917, with
a maximum penalty of 2 years' imprisonment
and $1,000 fine, for aggravated assault by auto-
mobile. See supra, p. 141. The New York statute
was passed in 1921, making the "culpably negli-
from a review of all these cases, it ap-
pears that penalties have played a
much smaller part in the development
of modern judge-made law than Pro-
fessor Tulin's article seemed to indi-
cate.
Of course, where the meaning of a
statute is in doubt, courts should and
do consider whether the penalty sheds
any light on the probable intention of
the legislature. This is a particularly
fruitful source of light where the ques-
tion at issue is whether the requirement
of a fraudulent intent is to be read into
a statute.6 8 But it would seem better
on the whole, in the case of aggravated
assault, if there had been no convic-
tions based on reckless driving under
statutes requiring a specific intent to
injure or kill, even if the alternative
was a penalty for a simple assault
which the court felt to be inadequate.
In Texas and New York, where the
courts declined to let recklessness play
the role of intent in assault and battery,
corrective legislation was rapidly forth-
coming to deal with the reckless driver
of an automobile.16 9 With legislatures
as active as they are today, and in a
better position than most courts to
judge of the desires of their citizens,
judicial restraint seems wiser than ever.
gent" operation of a vehicle "whereby another
suffers bodily injury" into an assault in the
third degree, carrying punishment up to one
year and fine up to $500, or both. See supra, p. 141.
The legislatures of Colorado and Iowa have
not raised their maximum penalties for simple
assault and battery since the decisions referred
to. The Colorado penalty for assault and bat-
tery was already about adequate for a reckless
driver-6 months' imprisonment or $100 fine.
Courtright Stat. (1913) §1659. The Iowa legisla-
ture has permitted cumulation of assault and
reckless driving penalties in its latest statute,
which will permit a maximum sentence of 60
days' imprisonment and $200 fine for a battery
by reckless driving. Laws 1937, c. 134, §§311, 314,
315; Code (1935) §12929.
